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The Euthanasia Debate in the Netherlands: 
Biolegal, Bioethical and Biotheological Considerations 
Euthanasia has been the subject of 
intense and extensive debate in The 
Netherlands ever since 1952, and recent-
ly within the United States of AlT)erica. 
The biolegal aspects of the debate as it 
has developed in The Netherlands pro-
vide substantial bases for bioethical 
examination. Yet, where bioethical and 
philosophical conundrums, biomedical 
technologies and biolegal technicalities 
lead us in circles, biotheological consid-
erations enter the arena to call believing 
people to act upon and live out in fact 
their programs and articulations of faith. 
A substantial number of USA media 
presentations of the situation in The 
Netherlands use the terms "mercy-kill-
ing" and "euthanasia" interchangeably, 
and suggest that euthanasia there has 
been legalized. Euthanasia has not been 
legalized in that country, nor in any coun-
try of the world. Euthanasia has been the 
subject of intense and extensive debate 
in The Netherlands ever since 1952. The 
pivotal Leeuwarden and Rotterdam 
cases in 1973 and 1981, respectively, 
have received particular attention arising 
from the request of a patient to have 
his/her life terminated and/or assistance 
. in suicide. 
The Dutch define "euthanasia" as 
"the intentional termination of life by 
another party at the persistent and 
repeated request of the person con-
By 
Sr. Teresa A. Takken, Ph.D. 
Director, The Pacific Institute for Bioethics 
cerned." "Mercy-killing," distinct from 
euthanasia, denotes involuntary killing of 
patients and maintains the emotional, 
psychological and social link to the prac-
tices of the Third Reich in the 1930s and 
early 1 940s. 
Because of the mass confusion sur-
rounding the definition of euthanasia in 
the USA, it is perhaps important to clarify 
what euthanasia is NOT: 
i) actions to withhold or suspend 
treatment at the explicit and earnest 
request of the patient; 
ii) actions to withhold or suspend 
treatment in cases where such 
treatment is deemed pointless 
according to prevailing medical 
opinion; 
iii) failure to treat a secondary illness or 
disorder in the case of a patient who, 
according to prevailing medical 
opinion, has irreversibly lost 
consciousness; 
iv) hastening death as a secondary 
effect of treatment which is itself 
specifically designed to relieve suf-
fering on the part of the patient and 
which is essential for that purpose. 
In 1981, the Court of Rotterdam lifted 
the punishment imposed upon one who 
assists another to die and permitted the 
phYSician in that case to go unpunished 
for administering a lethal injection to a 
patient who had requested death based 
upon nine strict criteria which were met: 
1) There must be psychological or 
physical suffering that through the 
expression of the supplicant is 
stated to be an experience which is 
intolerable and insufferable; 
2) The experience of suffering itself 
and the desire to die must be dura-
ble and perSistent; 
3) The decision to die is established to 
be completely voluntary on the part 
of the patient/supplicant; 
4) The supplicant must have a reason-
able understanding of his/her situa-
tion and of all possible alternatives; 
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she/he must be in such a state as to 
weigh the options and alternatives, 
and must have completed this pro-
cess upon requesting physician-
assistance to die; 
5) There must be no other reasonable 
solution apparent to improve the 
situation; 
6) The decision to provide assistance 
to die may not be determined by 
only one person; 
7) There must always be present a 
physician who is responsible for the 
prescription of the method eventu-
ally used (e.g ., lethal injection); 
8) There must be no unnecessary 
distress brought upon any others 
involved; 
9) With the decision toward the assist-
ance to die, as'Weil as with the per-
formance of the act itself, the great-
est possible care must be observed. 
The above nine were expanded in 
drafts of March 26 and December 11, 
1987, to include the following, presently 
holding 17 strict criteria: 
10) The physician must personally noti-
fy the Public Prosecutor that he/she 
has terminated the life of a patient or 
assisted the patient in the taking of 
his/her own life; 
11) The notification must be accompa-
nied by a statement of the manner in 
which the criteria specified in the 
Criminal Code had been taken into 
account; 
12) The Public Prosecutor shall also be 
handed a declaration setting forth 
the findings of the independent phy-
sician consulted by the attending 
physician; 
13) The independent physician must be 
chosen from the special state listing, 
to ensure noncollaboration in a 
criminal action; 
14) The attending physician must ad-
vise personally the Registrar of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages, in all 
instances of death from unnatural 
causes; 
15) Funeral arrangements could be 
made only if the Public Prosecutor 
issues a certificate of no objection to 
burial or cremation; 
16) The physician in charge must refer 
to the fact of euthanasia as the 
cause of death when completing the 
cause-of-death form; 
17) The physician is mandated to log 
each event in a journal which would 
be open to public scrutiny and held 
for at least five years from the date 
the patient first expressed a request 
to receive physician-assisted death. 
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Since January, 1987, the Dutch gov-
ernment has held that the existing prohi-
bition of euthanasia not be lifted since no 
one should be exempt from prosecution 
for performing euthanasia. Present Dutch 
legislation construes termination of life 
upon request as murder or manslaugh-
ter, subject to mitigating circumstances 
of the request. Physicians who terminate 
the life of a patient based upon an earn-
est, repeated, consistent, expressed and 
rational request on the part of the patient, 
are guilty of a criminal offense under arti-
cle 293 of the Penal Code and render 
themselves thereby liable to prosecution 
and punishment. Yet, a physician may 
invoke force majeur (necessity) and 
be immune from punishment only if 
the above-cited sedulous requirements 
are met. 
Bioethical Considerations 
Key elements of the euthanasia debate 
have to do more with bioethical scrutini-
zation than with biomedical or biolegal: 
for example, that a disease is said to be 
incurable, that a terminal stage has been 
reached, that a patient will die within a 
certain time period, that a patient suffers 
unbearable pain, or that a situation has 
become untenable. In addition to these 
examples, there are other bioethical 
issues in the debate which deserve 
mention. 
First, the USA distinction between so-
called active and passive euthanasia is 
based upon the difference between act-
ing and omitting. However, in the legal 
forum, acting is the same as omitting if 
acting is considered to be a duty in a 
given situation. It is precisely the deter-
mination of when one must act, and how 
far one must go in acting to save the life 
of another that is in question here. In the 
USA "saving" is usually translated into 
"prolonging life" and "protracting death," 
and perhaps there lies the key. Also cen-
tral in this discussion is the insistent 
request of the patient, which then consti-
tutes inaction as a legitimate refusal of 
medical treatment on the part of the 
patient. The phrase "passive euthana-
sia" is found to be not only useless but 
even hazardous; it could suggest that the 
termination of the life of a patient by 
omission of treatment without that 
patient's express request would be an 
acceptable manner of euthanasia. 
Next, incurability is scientifically not 
well defined, and as a criterion itself 
would cause problems. For instance, 
would a healthy diabetic be eligible for 
euthanasia as opposed to a victim of a 
severe accident who has no incurable 
disease? 
Thirdly, there is a distinction between 
medical acts, and social acts in which 
doctors are involved. Medical acts are 
judged upon the basis of professiona/ 
standards set forth by the medical pro-
fession itself; for judgments upon a 
social-ethical action such as euthana-
sia, no medical professional norms exist. 
Physicians disagree on euthanasia and 
this disagreement demonstrates the 
nature of the subject: bioethical and 
biomoral, biotheological and, in part, 
biolegal. 
Next, if euthanasia becomes legalized 
for tighter control, public scrutiny and 
greater protection from possible abuse, 
then the discussion could cease and the 
debate be considered over. The debate 
in its roots and origins is important to 
maintain for at least two reasons: eutha-
nasia appears to be the "treatment" for a 
disease of which we as a society do 
not know the origin or the "diagnosis"! 
Western society needs to steer slowly 
through the storms of such a vital debate; 
important nuances are overlooked when 
we move too fast. 
Fifth, the increasing awareness of 
personal autonomy is central to bioethi-
cal discussion today, and to the eutha-
nasia debate in particular. How far-
extending are individual rights? Do these 
include the end of life? Is the end of life 
part of life? 
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WHAT CAN WE LEARN? 
By 
Donald R. Tredway, M.D., Ph.D. 
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
School of Medicine 
Lorna Linda University 
The important court case which prompted us to choose this 
topic comes out of Tennessee in 1989. Mary Sue Davis and her 
husband Junior Lewis Davis had produced seven embryos in 
vitro, and these had been preserved by freezing. Then the couple 
Jivorced, and a question arose as to the disposition of the 
embryos. Mrs. Davis desired to carry one of the embryos to term 
and have the baby. Her ex-husband disagreed. The question 
was, what should be done? As many of us are aware, the court 
decided that not just seven embryos, but seven human beings, 
were involved. 
In vitro fertilization is a couple-related problem. It takes place in 
glass or within the test tube or petri dish. In vitro fertilization first 
occurred in 1978 in England with Steptoe and Edwards who 
achieved the first human birth resulting from IVF. They had pre-
viously tried 500 times unsuccessfully. A group in Australia, under 
the leadership of Trowsend in Melbourne, started using stimulated 
cycles to produce multiple eggs. Their first birth resulted from that 
procedure in 1981. In the United States, the Jones Institute at 
Norfolk, Virginia, achieved the first birth from in vitro procedures in 
this century. 
Several different in vitro treatment protocols are used. One of 
these employs serophene and pergonal. The major point with a 
treatment protocol is to try to get more than one oocyte or follicle to 
develop. In the normal cycle we'd usually have one to two follicles 
develop. During the time of administration of the drugs we do 
intensive monitoring with various steroids to measure the daily 
estrogen. In this situation we're also measuring gonadotropin (a 
hormone produced by the pituitary gland to make sure that we 
have total control of the cycle). Then, when we think that we have 
reached the size and level that we desire, we give a final shot to 
produce natural ovulation within 36 hours. Shortly before this 
occurs, we take the patient to the operating room and retrieve the 
oocytes, the eggs, by various methods. The patient is maintained 
>n exogenous hormones during this time. 
In our facility we're doing a retrieval under vaginal-directed 
ultrasound. The follicular fluid is given to the embryologist, who is 
looking for the oocytes. Hopefully she will tell us that she has found 
a nice, mature oocyte (an egg with an expanded acumulus mass). 
Once the eggs are preincubated for a period of time, insemination 
takes place and in the insemination media the oocytes are placed 
within an incubator for fertilization to occur. 
Let's say that in this case, a couple of days later an embryo has 
developed-perhaps an 8-cell embryo. With the embryos in 
place, we 've used a little device to transfer the embryo or embryos 
into the uterus. After this we wait two weeks, while the patient is on 
exogenous hormones, to see if pregnancy occurs. 
According to the National Registry, there were fewe r 
than 15,000 cases of in vitro fertilization in the United States in 
1987. The success rate per cycle is low-only an average of 16 
percent. In individual situations and institutions you can get as 
high as 25 or 30 percent, but the overall average is 16. Also, recall 
in a normal cycle with no problems between husband and wife 
is 25 to 30 percent. 
When we first started doing in vitro fertilization, we would try to 
transfer more than one embryo. The pregnancy rate did increase, 
but reached a point where multiple gestation occurs. Not long ago 
we were transferring eight and ten embryos, but then we had a 
high rate of multiple gestation, resulting in premature labor or 
miscarriages. At present, most programs will use only three or four 
embryos, at the most five. After that multiple gestations increase. If 
we have multiple embryos we may end up with ten or twelve of 
them. If we put back three or four, what do we do with the others? 
That's how cryopreservation has come into mode. Theoretically, if 
we freeze the embryos and if they survive a freezing and thawing 
episode, we could come back in a normal non-stimulated cycle 
and transfer those embryos back and have pregnancy occur. 
"The court decided that not just seven 
embryos, but seven human beings, were 
involved." 
Unfortunately, with the current status of cryopreservation the 
overall pregnancy rate per cycle is only eight percent. Pregnan-
cies are accumulative, so that we may be able to get enough 
embryos to take a patient through three or four cycles, with a 
cumUlative pregnancy rate that would be higher at a lesser 
cost.The average cost for IVF per cycle will vary from one institu-
tion to another, but it is usually from $5,000 to $8,000 per cycle. 
In medicine we have many debates about abortion and the 
rights of the full-fledged fetus. Now we have introduced another 
area-the embryo. With these new reproductive procedures, 
we're dealing with all sorts of ethical considerations. In the Davis 
case, the biological characteristics of the pre-embryo and its 
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moral and legal status are involved, and we must deal also with the 
subject of cryopreservation of embryos. 
A pre-embryo is defined as the period of development from the 
end ofthe fertilization process to when we have the appearance of 
the primitive streak. During the firstfourteen days of life, iffertiliza-
tion occurs, the cells divide and go up through implantation. At the 
fourteenth day we will have the primitive streak. There's a differ-
ence among scientists as to the significance of this time period. 
Let's look at some of the characteristics that we know from the 
embryonic standpoint. 
During these first fourteen days of development, trophoblasts will 
dominate and nourish the subsequent embryo, so that most of the 
cells are not the embryo but cells nourishing the embryo. An 
individual may not develop at all because there is a high rate of 
spontaneous miscarriage or abortion during this stage. Two pre-
embryos may even fuse to form a single individual. 
Some scientists have considered it proper to experiment on life 
during this time period because a Single biological individual has 
not developed untirthe fourteenth day. However, newer data on 
gene transcription (DNA and RNA goes from one progeny to 
another) show that it is present and activated at least by the 
four-cell stage. So we can debate how we determine what life is. 
Here we have reflected a couple-related problem. From the 
standpOint of a group of Christian physicians, we feel that in vitro 
fertilization with the husband's sperm and wife 's eggs is accept-
able. We have difficulty speaking with certainty about cryopreser-
vation, but we do accept certain guidelines. One is that husband 
and wife should agree beforehand on the disposition of all leftover 
frozen embryos, if the wife becomes pregnant. An informed con-
sent policy for cryopreservation is being considered in its final 
form before the Institutional Review Board. In the Davis case no 
prearrangement was made. This consent form tries to fully inform 
the couple of different options and situations that can occur. We 
are doing cryopreservation mainly to avoid multiple pregnancies 
from transferring all of the embryos. 
Legal rights and status of the frozen embryos have not been 
fully determined. Because both husband and wife are participants, 
any decisions regarding the disposition of embryos must be made 
by mutual consent. If the couple is unable to reach a mutual 
decision, the court must determine the disposition of the embryos. 
Various situations can occur: the death of the wife, the death of the 
husband, divorce, etc. The couple, prior to starting cryopreserva-
tion of embryos, must agree on the possible disposition of 
the embryos. 
"As a scientist, I feel that I cannot make a 
morphological determination on the basis of 
rights of this pre-embryo that could be life." 
In a recent court case a physician refused to transfer embryos to 
another facility. This resulted in creation of a permit to release the 
embryos to another institution. Even where there are multiple 
permits, the couple may still have to appear in court to petition for 
the disposition of the embryos. 
The American Fertility Society puttogether an ethics committee 
which went through all of these technologies and made various 
recommendations. They could not agree on everything, but with 
regard to the type of case being discussed here, "We find a wide 
consensus that the pre-embryo is not a person, but is to be treated 
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with special respect because it is a genetically unique, living 
human entity that might become a person." 
From a scientific standpoint, this ruling is contrary to the court 
ruling in the Davis case. However, the committee admitted in ( 
footnote that this statement offers little guidance because there 
are no ethical or legal conclusions offered with regard to the 
pre-embryo. 
Where does life begin as a pre-embryo and as an individual? 
Does the pre-embryo have rights? In the State of Louisiana the 
pre-embryo has rights. As a scientist, I feel that I cannot make a 
morpholog ical determination on the basis of rights of this pre-
embryo that could be life. A moral, biological and legal decision 
must be made to guide the scientific community. 
A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
By 
Andrea K. Scott, J.D. 
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (Los Angeles) 
As autumn color tinged the Maryville, Tennessee, countryside 
last year, a young couple in the throes of a divorce could not agree 
on the disposition of their seven cryogenically preserved embryos, 
the product of in vitro fertilization. In Davis v. Davis ("Davis")1, a 
decision that may alter the course of biotechnology and the law, 
JudgeW. Dale Young ruled that human life begins at conception 
and that cryogenically preserved embryos-or preembryos, 
prezygotes and zygotes-are juridical persons, or human beings 
with legal status. 
In so holding, Judge Young set a number of legal precedent~ 
First, by extending legal status to a conceptus or embryo, Judge 
Young exceeded the Supreme Court's Roe v. Wade2 framework, 
which stands for the proposition that the interests of the mother 
outweigh those of a fetus during the first trimester of pregnancy. 
During these first three months, abortion for any reason is legal. 
Interestingly, the Davis ruling also contravenes the Tennessee 
Wrongful Death Statute3, which states that an unborn child is 
accorded juridical status only if it is "viable" at the time ofthe injury. 
Viability refers to the ability of a fetus to survive outside the womb, 
with life support if necessary. Even the Tennessee Criminal Abor-
tion Statute4 does not extend legal status to a fetus until the fourth 
month of the mother's pregnancy. Moreover, as Judge Young 
noted, no state in the union has to date "established a public policy 
declaring the [legal] rights to be accorded to a human embryo, in 
vitro, in a divorce case"5. 
Does this mean that embryos which are overtly destroyed or 
which perish from unintentionally being left in cryogenic storage 
too long have been murdered either by the parents or those in 
charge of the storage facility? The judiciary has not yet answered 
this question. One case from New York, however, sheds some 
light on judicial thinking about the emerging practice of in vitro 
fertilization. In Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospita/6 , in which embryos 
produced by in vitro fertilization were destroyed by a physician 
lacking institutional authority, ajury awarded the biological mother 
$50,000 for emotional distress. Significantly, the jury did not 
recognize the mother's ownership of the embryos. Similarly, the 
Del Zio Court neither considered the embryos to be the mother's 
property nor recognized the embryos to be children or juridical 
persons. ( 
Second, in holding that a conceptus or embryo in vitro is a child 
rather than a "potential person," as Justice Sandra Day 
O'Connor-the only Supreme Court Judge ever to have been 
pregnant-has termed them, Judge Young enabled the court to 
act as parens patriae, or the ultimate guardian of a child's welfare? 
When a court acts in the capacity of parens patriae, it is em-
( 'Dowered to take whatever action it deems necessary in "the best 
interest" of the child, even when such actions starkly conflict with 
the parents' claim of custody. In the Davis case, Judge Young 
ruled that the interests of the seven embryos would be best served 
by giving them into the custody of Mrs. Davis, who said she wished 
to have them all implanted and brought to full term. Mr. Davis did 
not want them implanted in Mrs. Davis or donated (anonymously) 
to a fertility clinic. Rather, Junior Davis preferred to maintain the 
embryos indefinitely in a cryogenically frozen state, alleging that 
any other dispositon of the embryos would amount to a " raping of 
reproductive rights"6. 
Specifically, Judge Young objected to Mr. Davis' intention to 
keep the embryos frozen indefinitely, holding that, "to allow cryo-
genically preserved human embryos to remain so preserved for a 
period exceeding two years is tantamount to the destruction of 
these human beings."9 Are we to interpret Judge Young's com-
ment to mean that M( Davis would be committing either murder or 
manslaughter by leaving the embryos in storage for more than two 
years? Hypothetically speaking, if twenty ova were culled from a 
woman and fertilized with her husband's sperm in an effort to 
ensure pregnancy using in vitro techniques, would Judge Young 
rule that the woman either must have each embryo implanted and 
possibly bear far more children than she (or her husband) wish to 
have, or must donate the unused embryos to strangers? If the 
woman does not wish to bear more than, say, three children or to 
donate the remaining embryos to a "bank", will she be guilty of 
murder or manslaughter by leaving them in storage too long? 
Third, Judge Young firmly rejected the concept that the embryos 
are fungible property, or indeed property of any kind lO. His ratio-
ale for this unequivocal ruling is that "human life begins at con-
ception" with the gametic union of female ova and male sperm. 
This ruling is at odds with considerable modern legal thought. For 
example, extracorporeal bodily fluids such as blood and sperm 
historically have been treated as property belonging to the individ-
ual who produced them. In California, the judiciary has taken the 
notion of extracorporeal body parts as property one step further. In 
Moore v. Regents of The University of California 11 , in which doc-
tors used biological materials from one of their patients to develop 
a patented product, an appellate court held that persons who give 
biological material to medical institutions for use or discard retain 
property rights over that material. Under Judge Young's ruling in 
the Davis case, couples may begin to forfeit to the courts control 
over their own genetic materials and progeny. 
"No less true than the legal adage that 
'hard cases make bad law' is the obser-
vation that personal dilemmas make 
bad ethics." 
Does Judge Young's ruling stand for the proposition that the 
judiciary is empowered to dictate how many children a couple 
must have because birth is in the "best interest" of their embryos? 
Or that the courts may order Mr. and Mrs. John Doe to give up their 
embryos to anonymous recipients rather than leave them in cryo-
genic storage until they (Mr. and Mrs. Doe) are physically, emo-
tionally and financially capable of raising more than the one, two or 
three children which resulted from initial in vitro procedures? 
Although it would be premature for anyone to attempt to answer 
these questions at this time, society must choose answers in the 
nearfuture.lfthe public does nottake responsibility for answering 
these questions by popular mandate, through elected officials, the 
courts will be forced to answer them by judicial fiat. 
Along with the gifts of biotechnological innovation come 
unprecedented and daunting ethical quandaries. In vitro fertiliza-
tion is a physically, emotionally and financially draining experience 
for any couple; although it is the woman who undergoes the 
debilitating medical procedures, her mate and the marriage itself 
also suffer considerable stress. That divorce sometimes results 
from such marital difficulties is not surprising. To lay blame at the 
Davis' doorstep, or on those of couples like them, serves no useful 
social function . Rather, such couples should be encouraged to 
apply common sense principles and planning to their encounter 
with biotechnology. What might the Davises have done differ-
ently? At a minimum, they might have conferred with a family 
planning expert or domestic relations attorney in an effort to formu-
late a written consent document making clear their mutual wishes 
in the event that (1) one or both parents changed their minds about 
having ch,ildren; (2) a divorce were to occur; (3) one or both parents 
were to become severely disabled; and (4) one or both parents 
were to die. 
The common law has devoted centuries and innumerable 
tomes to the subject of future interests, or the disposition of a 
deceased individual's property. Where does in vitro fertilization fit 
in the extant scheme of estate law? For example, in the event of 
the genetic parents' death, what would become of the cryogeni-
cally preserved embryos which Judge Young pronounced to be 
children? Could they be given to one surrogate (gestational) 
mother, or to a series of surrogate mothers in case the first one 
wanted only a single child? Could those embryos, once born alive, 
inherit their genetic parents' estate even though they were not 
born at the time of their parents' intestate or testamentary demise? 
Could an embryo inherit the parents' wealth, taking precedence 
over a child born to one of the parents years earlier? Could 
the surrogate parents of an embryonic child receive any part of 
the estate? 
By way of illustration, consider the case of Elsa and Mario Rios, 
who in 1983 died intestate in a plane crash shortly after travelling 
to Melbourne, Australia, for in vitro fertilization procedures. In addi-
tion to an $8 million dollar estate, they left a child in California from 
Mr. Rios' former marriage and two cryogenically frozen embryos 
in Australia. In 1987, facing a politically sensitive situation, the 
Victoria state parliament adopted special legislation directing that 
the Rios' orphan embryos be kept frozen until suitable surrogate 
mothers could be found. Further, the parliament ordered that 
neither the embryos nor the surrogate mothers could receive any 
share of the Rios' estate12. By way of a state law requiring that a 
child beneficiary be born alive or be in utero at the time of the 
parental death, the California judiciary similarly disqualified the 
orphan embryos from laying any claim to the Rios ' wealth 
in future13. 
Perhaps no less true than the legal adage that "hard cases 
make bad law" is the observation that personal dilemmas make 
bad ethics. The Davis case presents just such a dilemma for Mary 
Sue and Junior Lewis Davis, for the judiciary, for society at large. 
As a system, the common law evolves; its certitudes emerge from 
the frothy wake of societal change and technological innovation. 
Judge Young's ruling in Davis v. Davis may stand or it may be 
overturned. The judiciary in states other than Tennessee mayor 
may not follow Judge Young's reasoning. Regardless of the spe-
cific fate that befalls the Davis ruling, one of the most important 
lessons to be learned from this case is that we, individually and 
collectively, must make hard choices for ourselves. Each indi-
vidual has the freedom and the power to choose according to his 
or her personal beliefs what course the law should take in matters 
as innately private as reproduction. One can exercise that choice 
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through the political process, by communicating with elected 
representatives, or one can remain silent. In the face of such 
passivity, the law will surely evolve-possibly in ways that under-
mine medical progress and the advancement of biotechnology-
by judical fiat. 
ENDNOTES 
1 1989 Tenn. App. Lexis 641 (Sept. 21,1989). 
2 410 U.S. 113,93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). 
3 Tenn. Code Ann. Section 20-5-106(b). 
4 Tenn. Code Ann. Section 39-15-201 (c)(1 )(2)(3) (effective as of 
November 1, 1989). 
5 Davis v. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. Lexis 641, at 30-31. 
6 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
7 The doctrine of parens patriae is deeply rooted in the Anglo-
American common law tradition. Generally, it is defined as the 
"power of the sovereign to watch over the interests of those 
who are incapable of protecting themselves ... .The thrust of the 
equitable nature of this doctrine is that it turns its full focus on 
the best interests of the child; its concern is not for those who 
claim' rights' to the child, nor for those who claim custody of the 
child, nor for those who may suffer perceived or real inequities 
resulting from scrupulously guarding the child's best interest." 
Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. 641 at 34, quoting In re Baby M, 525 
A.2d 1127,1128, 109 N.J. 396,397 (1987). 
8 W Holden, " Davis Versus Davis" , The Daily Telegraph, 
Aug. 11, 1989, at 15-16. 
9 Davis v. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. Lexis 641 at 36. 
10 Davis v. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. Lexis 641, at 29. Professor 
John A. Robertson, an internationally respected legal scholar 
and expert in matters of law and biotechnology, posits that 
zygotes or preembryos constitute fungible property ofthe cou-
ple that produced them. He bases his position on the belief that 
embryos do not constitute life or human beings, but merely 
have the potential for life. Id. 
11 202 Cal. app. 1230 (1988). 
12 Lieber, "A Piece of Yourself In The World", 263 The Atlantic 
Monthly, June, 1989, at 76. 
13 Id. at 76-77. 
SOME THOUGHTS 
REGARDING FROZEN 
EMBRYOS AND DIVORCE 
By 
Madelynn Jones Haldeman, Th.O. 
Lorna Linda University Riverside 
School of Religion 
This paper is a reflection on the decision made by the judge who 
adjudicated the case of Mary Sue Davis and the frozen embryos 
belonging to both Mary Sue and her ex-husband Junior L. Butthe 
area for discussion hangs on the word potential, as used by the 
judge in his declaration on the fate of the embryos. The only 
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difference, according to the judge, between an embryo and a 
person is simply that the embryo is a potential human being 
whereas the other is a human being. The embryo has instructions 
on how and when to develop. ( 
It would appear that the innate instructions on how to develop 
into a human being become less and less intricate as each cell 
progresses. However, when the unborn child is born into the 
world, it also needs external instructions and care in order for it to 
continue developing into a living human being. And this point 
seems to be a most important one. A child without external instruc-
tions from a parent does not develop its human image, so it is not 
correct to say that a child born into this world is a developed 
human being. Rather, it has the potential for developing into a full 
human being. Unless a child is given the proper environment, 
trained with the correct instructions, both of which must be pro-
vided to the child before it reaches puberty, the human image will 
not and perhaps cannot become fully developed. Each stage of its 
development moves the potential human being closer to its goal of 
being a developed human being. Therefore, a zygote, embryo, 
fetus, or born child, each as a potential human being, represents a 
different stage in the developmental process. 
"Who is guilty if all the frozen embryos are 
not utilized before the two years go by?" 
The judge in this case decided that anything that is potentially a 
human being has the right to have the opportunity to come to full 
term, or to say it another way, it has the right to progress in its 
development. This right that has been invested in an undeveloped 
embryo can be nullified, it has been argued, in the matter of 
abortion. But there is another right that has to be considered: the 
right of the woman, as a fully developed human being, to decide 
whether she wants her body entered and made the place of abode 
for a developing embryo or fetus. This developed human being, by 
virtue of her anatomy and also her ability to make choices regard-
ing her own person, has a prior right to be exercised-prior to the 
right of that which is termed a potential human being. 
The right belonging to the potential human being has been 
declared to exist by fiat of fully developed human beings, but the 
potential human being cannot exercise a right above that of the 
fully developed human being, because the right to develop does 
not precede the right of permission for a place of development. 
Otherwise, the female fully developed human being cannot exer-
cise her right as an instructed fully developed human being to 
make choices. Thus the potential human being has more rights 
than the fully developed. Adults are being dictated to by what is not 
a fully developed human being. In the issue of abortion, these 
premises are rarely addressed. When they are discussed, the 
principle of life has prior importance over a fully developed 
female's right to make a choice about the development of life. 
In the matter of divorce, then, what can be said about the right of 
the embryo? Does the potential human being have any rights at 
all? Does this right have more weight than any other considera-
tion? Do couples who have zygotes frozen for future use have a 
responsibility to them even after their particular union is broken by 
divorce? The judge in this case thought so: A potential human 
being must be given the right to become all that it is instructed to 
become. This is the same argument as in the abortion issue. 
There are, however, other rights that cannot be ignored. The 
father has a right of choice, and he chooses to refuse to give thE' 
embryo any further opportunity for development, because the 
marriage has ended. I believe that the father has a right for choice 
also. The real question is, does the father have the right to change 
his mind? Originally, he was in full agreement with the wife that 
embryos be prepared for development. But circumstances altered 
his original choice. Can it be argued, then, that since the embryo is 
'\,Iy a potential human being, the choice of a developed human 
6eing, the husband in this case, should be considered above the 
embryo's so-called right to develop? The judge did not think so. 
The issue now appears to be whether the woman's choice is 
prior to the husband's choice. I believe that two must agree on the 
principle of wanting children. If the husband in a legal marriage 
wants children and the woman does not, it is my opinion that the 
woman's choice regarding whether her body may be used as an 
incubator has a prior right to that of her husband. However, if the 
husband does not wish to have children, the woman's right of 
choice regarding her bOdy is not the right under consideration. 
Rather, the wanting of the child must be agreed on before any 
other consideration. Therefore, I disagree with the decision of the 
judge who awarded the embryos to the mother. 
If one takes the position that because an embryo is a potential 
human being and therefore has a right to develop, regardless of 
the choice of developed human beings, the utilitarian ethic of 
aspirating many ova at one time to cut down on financial and 
emotional traumas is unacceptable. Therefore, I would be 
opposed to IVF if one accedes to the ethic that potential can be 
equated with fully developed. Only one ovum at a time should be 
aspirated regardless ofthe pain or cost. And ifthis embryo has the 
right to develop, what does one do with the nurse who spills the 
embryo when she trips and falls down while carrying the embryo to 
the doctor for imbedding in the uterus of a patient? Is she accused 
of murder? And who is guilty if all the frozen embryos are not 
utilized before the two years go by? 
"Do couples who have zygotes frozen for 
future· use have a responsibility to them 
even after their particular union is broken 
by divorce?" 
The issue of a utilitarian ethic seems to be part of the entire 
problem. The monetary expense to the couple and the emotional 
and physical trauma to the woman in particular provide a reason-
able premise for obtaining a number of embryos at one time. But 
embryos cannot exist very long unless they are frozen. This pro-
cess is called cryopreservation and provides the embryos with 
approximately a two-year period of potential life. But the question 
remains regarding the leftover embryos. What are to be done with 
these? If these embryos are indeed potential human beings, it 
appears imprudent and unethical to dispose of them, or for that 
matter, to have any excess of them. 
And now, to go one step further in this discussion. Perhaps one 
way to solve the dilemma of extra embryos would be to make men 
and women declare under oath before they are marrie.d to each 
other that they will become responsible for all embryos, whether 
they stay married or get divorced. 
Another problem arises if one accepts that the embryo is poten-
tiallya human being: There is no guarantee that a human error will 
'lot occur to this potential human. Of course, in all of our treatment 
:the human body, no one can guarantee that mistakes will not be 
made and human beings will not forfeit their lives. Thus, in every 
medical treatment there is a risk to be taken because of the human 
potential for making mistakes. So it would appear that to argue 
against IVF on the basis of the human element making mistakes, 
such as in the case of a nurse who trips and spills the embryos, 
does not lend itself in the argument for or against the IVF process. 
But there is a difference between making a human mistake in the 
process of IVF and disposing ofthe embryos deliberately because 
the marriage is over. One act is unpremeditated and the other is 
meditated. Of course, people can be paid to trip and fall while 
caring for the embryos, or people can find all kinds of excuses for 
not using the embryos-excuses that might be acceptable in court. 
It would seem to me that if one argues that the embryo is a 
potential human being and, therefore, has a right to development, 
then the medical profession is ethically bound to protect its 
embryos from annihilation by human error as much as is possible 
and to question the ethics of multiple aspirations. If, of course, one 
argues that a potential human being and a developed human 
being are not at all the same thing, it simply does not matter 
whether the IV solution is spilled or ifthe embryos are disposed of 
deliberately. However, I find the utilitarian principle unacceptable if 
one predicates that the embryo is a potential human being and that 
potential, defined as having innate instructions, is equivalent to the 
developed human. Mistakes are part of the human existence, but 
having a surplus of embryos and not knowing what to do with them 
seems an untenable position. Based on the position of the judge in 
this case, I would have to cast my vote against IVF, or at least, 
against multiple aspirations of ova at one time. On the other hand, 
if one can reasonably conclude that the potential human being is 
subject to the rights of the developed human beings, then the 
judge in this case created a tempest in a teapot, and the right of the 
ex-husband must be considered of prime importance. 
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Netherlands - continued 
Sixth, in the USA the popular trend is 
one of "procedural bioethics": contrac-
tual relationships between voluntarily 
consenting adults. The securing of con-
tracts, the negotiation of procedures and 
protocols, and the espousal of one or two 
bioethical principles to the exclusion of 
important others, creates an atmosphere 
of fragmentation, abandonment and iso-
lation of individuals in need; an imbal-
ance between the individual and the 
community. The lack of concern for the 
content and substance of such contracts, 
for example, leans toward superficiality. 
Next, we must ask if it makes sense 
that we consider putting an end to the 
suffering of a person by putting an end to 
the sufferer?-that medical instruments 
have become "weapons" aimed at the 
well-being of the patient which hit the 
bearer of the disease, instead of 
the disease? 
Not last and not least, should euthana-
sia be legalized because of our social 
ills? Have we no room for each other 
psychologically, emotionally, spiritually? 
Have we not enough reserves to 
accompany each other to the edges 
of life? Are we so unused to suffering 
and to suffering-with in our suffering-
free society? 
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Biotheological 
Considerations 
But now enter moral theology, or, in the 
case of euthanasia and the life-dilem-
mas, biotheology. The field of pastoral 
medicine, the precursor to contemporary 
medical ethics, enters where bioethical 
and philosophical conundrums, biomed-
ical technologies and biolegal technicali-
ties lead us in circles. What is lacking in 
the euthanasia debate is the dynamic 
notion of God-with-us. Taking this view, I 
assert that suffering, in, of and for itself 
remains meaningless. Our struggle 
against and amidst it is not nonsense, 
however, but is urgent and necessary. I 
further propose that God does not will, 
allow or permit suffering, since God is 
first and foremost all-loving. God, the lov-
ing parent and initiator of grace, creates, 
warms, transforms, lightens, enlightens, 
encourages and empowers humanity to 
conquer suffering by going right through 
it! God is the inspiration of our efforts to 
relieve suffering as the ultimate non-
violent power: the One who empowers 
us and strengthens us to endure. 
Here, God is the and yet, still talking, 
when death thinks it has had the final say 
on life. Jesus, the Crucified-but-Alive-
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One, struggles with us in our efforts 
against suffering as the Immanuel: God-
with-us. Jesus of the Gospels comes to 
do something about it, real and present, 
as the compassionate, empathetic One; 
as one who died because of us and rosp 
in spite of us-to continue living for u~ 
Conclusion 
America is desperately seeking an 
ethic which may speak with some sense 
of rational authority across the diversity 
of faith, opinion and world view which is 
at once the agony as well as the ecstasy 
of the American Dream. Because many 
of us Americans who claim to be people 
of faith have not acted in fact upon our 
articulated words and programs of 
faith, we all suffer today as legislation 
is proposed which requests putting an 
end to suffering by putting an end to the 
life ofthe sufferer. The Real Presence we 
claim must be lived in reality: standing 
by, in, through, and with each other, 
being-with, really present to and for 
each other. 
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